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The plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure serves as a favorable screening device, 
separating between the guilty and the innocent. Previous literature ignored the impact of 
asymmetric information on prosecutor performance inside the adversarial court, which 
degrades his bargaining position. This paper presents a sequential prosecution game with 
endogenous courts, and shows that the successful conviction in court crucially depends on 
prosecutor´s beliefs and incentives. If the prosecutor is sufficiently convinced of the 
defendant´s guilt ex-ante, he can commit to trial, and the favorable semiseparating equilibrium 
is obtained. Applying the first formal model of a hindsight biased prosecutor, we find that the 
negative impact of uncertainty on prosecutor performance is partly mitigated by hindsight bias, 
and the self-selection of guilty defendants can even improve. Several caveats, like excessive 
charges, the nature of the case or the quality of investigations by the police force are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors are meant to solve crime and bring criminals to trial. A common element of 
criminal procedure, however, is the plea bargain between the prosecutor and the defendant 
in which the latter pleads guilty to a reduced charge, and court procedures are avoided. 
Despite a controversial public and legal debate about such deals, for a long time 
economically-oriented scholars have argued that plea bargaining is socially desirable. Such 
pretrial agreements would be negotiated in the shadow of the court´s jurisdiction, but save 
resources and eliminate the risk inherent to any trial.  
 Another desirable feature of plea bargaining is the revelation of hidden information. 
Even though the prosecutor does not know the actual guilt of a suspect, guilty and innocent 
defendants may show different reactions to a given plea offer. Thus, the plea bargaining 
mechanism can induce at least a partial separation between the guilty and the innocent. In 
a game-theoretic approach, BAKER and MEZZETTI (2001) examine the strategic interaction 
between a rational prosecutor and a rational defendant with exogenous courts, and find 
such a semiseparating equilibrium: some guilty defendants reveal themselves and accept the 
plea bargain, while the remaining guilty and all innocent defendants reject it and move to 
trial. In the world of this model, it is the credible threat of the prosecutor to go to trial 
whenever a plea offer is rejected that drives the favorable self-selection process. 
 Although the theoretical results appear reassuring, it remains unclear whether the 
actual bargaining situation is completely understood. Prosecutors are plagued by 
uncertainty, as they seek to avoid convicting innocent individuals. How can a prosecutor 
credibly threaten to charge a defendant when uncertainty will persist inside courtroom and 
the decision of the adversarial court totally hinges on the prosecutor´s own line of 
argument? What happens if guilty defendants further manipulate the prosecutor´s 
confidence in his case? The established models with exogenous courts ignore the potentially 
negative impact of uncertainty on prosecutor performance inside courts, which also 
degrades his bargaining power. Yet, plea bargaining still appears to be common practice 
among prosecutors (see, e.g., GAROUPA 2012, EASTERBROOK 2013). 
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In order to resolve this puzzle, it is the aim of this paper to study the self-selection 
mechanism of plea bargaining when trials are endogenous. To distinguish our results from 
the previous literature, we use the BAKER and MEZZETTI (2001) model as framework, and 
introduce an additional litigation stage. We show that some negative effects of uncertainty 
on prosecutor performance are possibly mitigated if the prosecutor is no longer assumed to 
be a rational (Bayesian) decision-maker. In this regard, we provide the first formal analysis 
of a prosecutor under hindsight bias1, and derive implications for the efficiency of plea 
bargaining.  
 The paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews the related literature. In 
chapter 3, the basic framework of the prosecution game and the formal concept of hindsight 
bias are introduced. Chapter 4 analyzes the different stages of the game, and chapter 5 
identifies its equilibria. Welfare implications are presented in chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses 
the main contribution to the literature, and chapter 8 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The economic analysis of public law enforcement was essentially sparked by the landmark 
articles of BECKER (1968) and LANDES (1971) who applied the concepts of maximization and 
scarcity to the criminal justice system. Since then, scholars have focused (i) on deterrence 
and punishment (see, among others, MALIK 1990, EHRLICH 1996, ENTORF 2011) and (ii) on 
public choice applications, such as prosecutor elections (see, e.g., GORDON and HUBER 2002, 
HILTON and KHANNA 2007, VAN AAKEN et al. 2008, MCCANNON 2013). Nevertheless, the 
main interest of researchers has yet been dedicated to the decision-making of the 
prosecutorial body and the controversial plea bargaining mechanism, which is also the topic 
                                                 
1 Hindsight biased defines the phenomenon that decision-makers fail to correctly remember how uninformed 
they were ex-ante when they are confronted with outcome knowledge. As a consequence, hindsight biased 
agents tend to believe more strongly in what they observe than a rational decision-maker would do (see, e.g., 
FISCHHOFF 2003, p.304). 
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of this paper. Compared to civil law or antitrust law, however, the law & economics 
literature in this field may still be relatively underdeveloped (see, e.g., GAROUPA 2012). 
 The literature on the plea bargaining mechanism, as the criminal law equivalent to 
pretrial settlements in commercial law (see, e.g., PRIEST and KLEIN 1984), basically follows 
two major strands.  
 The first strand of literature regards plea bargaining as a pricing device for crimes 
(see, among others, LANDES 1971, ADELSTEIN 1979, COVEY 2009, EASTERBROOK 2013). From 
that perspective, both the prosecutorial office and the suspect are subject to a scarcity 
constraint, and bargaining offers a Pareto-improvement: Prosecutors want to conclude cases 
and achieve guilty pleas while defendants yield simply for receiving a shorter sentence. The 
punishment as a price for a criminal act thus reflects a trade of acquittal probabilities for 
prison time.2 Based on this pricing concept, several requirements for successful plea bargains 
could be derived, such as equal beliefs on trial outcome or risk-neutrality, which are also 
reminiscent of the traditional settlement literature (see, e.g., SHAVELL 1982, SCOTT and 
STUNTZ 1992, LEWISH 1999). However, several works have recently questioned the asserted 
efficiency of this pricing mechanism. BIBAS (2004) argues that the pricing mechanism is also 
affected in a not systematical manner by impact factors that are not related to the criminal 
case, such as wealth, class, sex or age, which then creates troubling disparities in public 
enforcement. Similarly, DELACOTE and ANCELOT (2009) demonstrate that lawyer fee 
schemes influence bargaining outcome, and finds that hourly wages, which can only be 
afforded by richer defendants, induce lower sentences and better bargaining offers. 
Furthermore, the imperfection of trials also carries over to plea bargaining whenever 
innocent individuals perceive a wrongful admission of guilt as the ‘better price’ (see COVEY 
2009). Whether the pricing mechanism of plea bargaining is also applicable and desirable 
                                                 
2 Among legal scholars (not practitioners!), the rationale of plea bargaining, treating the defendant´s right to 
trial as a commodity, has been heavily criticized (see, among others, ALSCHULER 1983). 
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for inquisitorial legal regimes remains questionable (see, e.g., BOARI and FIORENTINI 2000, 
ADELSTEIN and MICELI 2001, GAROUPA and STEPHEN 2008, ALTENHAIN 2010). 
 The second strand in the literature interprets plea bargaining as a screening device. 
This game-theoretic perspective was first proposed by GROSSMANN and KATZ (1983) who 
identified asymmetric information about the defendant´s true guilt as the major obstacle to 
efficient enforcement. The prosecutor´s plea offer could then induce an efficiency 
enhancing self-selection process where the guilty defendants accept the bargain and the 
innocent defendants reject it. The framework has been extended by REINGANUM (1988), 
who introduced the observation of a signal about the defendant´s type prior to the trial, 
and KOBAYASHI and LOTT (1996) who considered diverging behavior between guilty and 
innocent defendants in court. In contrast to the basic model, the latter modification allows 
for the separating solution even when the defendant types have different attitudes to risk. 
BAKER and MEZZETTI (2001) then pointed out that the basic screening model relied on the 
incredible threat of the prosecutor to move to court, as in equilibrium only innocent 
defendants would reject the plea offer. Given exogenous verification in court, the authors 
demonstrated that plea bargaining still induces a desirable and subgame perfect self-
selection effect where some guilty defendants accept the bargain and all remaining 
defendants reject it. A similar semiseparating solution is also obtained by BJERK (2007) for 
endogenous jury decisions, and by KIM (2008) even for the case that the prosecutor cannot 
credibly commit to charge the defendant. Moreover, BAR-GILL and BEN-SHAHAR (2009) 
indicate that even though the prosecutor can never credibly commit to charge all 
defendants, given his budget constraint, the collective refusal of the defendants resembles 
a public good game, and fails. 
 Both strands in the plea bargaining literature are typically based on two crucial 
assumptions, that is the efficient prosecutor hypothesis and rational behavior. 
 Firstly, the efficient prosecutor model assumes that the prosecutor´s preferences 
coincide with those of society (see, e.g., EASTERBROOK 1983, GROSSMAN and KATZ 1983,  
REINGANUM 1988, p.717, and largely also BAKER and MEZZETTI 2001, p.165). Consequently, 
it is socially beneficial that the charge is at the unlimited discretion of the assumed 
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benevolent prosecutor. A more realistic approach has to consider that the prosecutor is no 
social planer but an economic agent. Thus, he reacts to incentives and pursues private goals, 
such as conviction maximization (see RAMSEYER and RASMUSSEN 2000), career opportunities 
(BOYLAN and LONG 2005), political success (see BERDEJO and YUCHTMAN 2013), or leisure 
(see BIBAS 2004). TULLOCK (1975) further highlighted that a private decision, irrespective of 
the preferences, usually does not consider all relevant costs to society. Given this 
perspective, the plea bargaining mechanism operates in a principal-agent framework, and 
it becomes doubtful whether the prosecutor´s bargaining strategy is always in society´s best 
interest. As an example, BJERK (2005) found that prosecutor´s use their discretion about the 
charged crime to circumvent sentencing guidelines when seeking successful plea bargains. 
As a positive effect, MICELI (1996) concluded that selfish prosecutors may prevent 
maximizing legislators from increasing fines as high as possible and cutting apprehension 
effort, and thus help to maintain deterrence with punishments at reasonable levels. 
 Secondly, the efficiency of plea bargaining relies on the correct interpretation of 
punishment prices and observed signals for screening by a rational economic agent (so-
called ‘REMM-hypothesis’3). The growing insights of behavioral economics, however, 
revealed several constraints to human decision-making, and developed alternative concepts 
of limited rationality to capture these effects.4 Concerning the plea bargaining mechanism, 
several authors suggest distinct biases to distort the behavior of the prosecutor, such as 
overconfidence, denial, discounting of future costs and the sunk cost fallacy. According to 
BIBAS (2004), the framing of the plea bargaining situation leads to diverging behavior:  the 
gain-framed prosecutor will be less risk-taking and less aggressive than the loss-framed 
defendant. Furthermore, the author speculates about a relevant anchoring effect of the 
initial plea offer, as the initial offer typically serves as a reference for the subsequent 
                                                 
3 Rational-Evaluating-Maximizing-Man. 
4 For example, behavioral economists studied the use of different heuristics and the resulting biases. A more 
realistic model of human decision-making was proposed by prospect theory (see, e.g., KAHNEMAN and 
TVERSKY 1984). 
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negotiations. BURKE (2007) acknowledges that selective information can amplify an a priori 
opinion, thus inflating the prosecutor´s beliefs about the strength of the case. Interestingly, 
researchers show a remarkable consensus that hindsight bias5 poses a substantial problem 
to the correct interpretation of evidence by the prosecutor (see, among others, BIBAS 2004,  
BURKE 2007, GAROUPA 2012): (i) The prosecutor may subconsciously adjust his ex-ante 
belief and doubts about the defendant´s guilt to fit the observed evidence (‘memory 
distortion’). (ii) When losing/winning a trial, the prosecutor may falsely believe ex-post that 
he anticipated this outcome all along, and is surprised that others did not (‘knew-it-all-
along effect’). (iii) When evaluating the defendant´s guilt, the prosecutor has the advantage 
of knowing the outcome and all consequences of the defendant´s action with certainty, 
while the defendant did not when committing the criminal act (‘outcome effect’).  
 Previous research has so far established crucial determinants for the efficiency of the 
plea bargaining mechanism. However, the behavior of the prosecutor after having filed the 
charge is hardly studied, and some further general assumptions remain questionable. It is 
thus the scope of this paper to study prosecutor behavior under uncertainty inside the court, 
and to provide a first formal analysis of the effects of limited rationality, exemplified by the 
hindsight bias, on the efficiency of plea bargaining.  
3. THE MODEL 
In the following, we extend the framework model exemplified by BAKER and MEZZETTI 
(2001). We endogenize court procedures at the end of the game and thereby introduce 
                                                 
5 Hindsight bias is to be distinguished from other behavioral biases, even though some symptoms appear 
similar. Overconfidence implies that an agent believes himself more capable than the average individual. 
Confirmation bias describes the unconscious selection of information in a way that is always in line with the 
agent´s ex-ante beliefs. Hindsight bias distorts the memory of the agent´s ex-ante beliefs in a way to be in 
line with the observed outcome. 
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asymmetric information to the courtroom. Moreover, we provide a formal concept to 
integrate hindsight bias and biased learning into our model. 
 
3.1 Basic Setup 
Consider the legal process as a game with two players, the prosecutor (P) and the defendant 
(D). The defendant can be either guilty of a crime, G , or innocent, I . The type of the 
defendant is exogenously specified by nature (N) at the beginning of the game, and only the 
defendant knows his true type. The ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant is defined as 
5.0 , and is common knowledge. This assumption captures the fact that criminal cases 
are transferred to the prosecutor´s office only if the police force has acquired a certain level 
of evidence (probable cause) and at least believes the suspect to be more likely guilty than 
innocent. Consequently, both players know that a larger fraction   of all defendants is 
indeed guilty. Information asymmetry exists as the prosecutor does not know for certain 
the true type of the defendant. Thus, the prosecutor has to form (rational) beliefs about the 
defendant´s type throughout the game. All other information is common knowledge. 
The defendant is accused of committing the crime X , with X resembling the harm 
to society. Given a conviction, the defendant receives a utility of X , and zero otherwise. 
The convicted defendant´s disutility can be interpreted as prison time or a monetary 
penalty. The prosecutor receives a utility of X if the guilty defendant is convicted and a 
utility of bX , with 0b , if an innocent defendant is sentenced. The prosecutor always 
receives a utility of zero if the defendant is set free. Consequently, the prosecutor (and 
society) is interested in punishing criminals and setting free innocent individuals. The 
variable  b  captures the relative severity of wrongful convictions, which may vary between 
prosecutors (and societies). Furthermore, the prosecutor receives a utility of  cX , with  
01  c , if he loses a case in court. This disutility can be interpreted as the damage to the 
prosecutor´s reputation whenever he loses a case he decided to bring to court. The 
reputational loss is contingent on the severity of the crime, as the prosecutor´s reputation 
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is more affected by the outcome of a severe case, such as murder or rape, than by minor 
offences.6 Both players are assumed to be risk-neutral, and maximize their expected utility. 
In order to capture major institutional features of adversary legal systems, we assert 
that the prosecutor has complete bargaining power. Thus, the prosecutor can make a take-
it-or-leave it plea offer to the defendant. Furthermore, as the court has no inquisitorial 
authority and cannot generate evidence on its own, we stylize litigation in adversary courts 
in the tradition of TULLOCK (1975) as rent-seeking games. In other words, litigation 
resembles a “trial by battle” (TULLOCK 1975, p.746), and the probability of winning in court 
is defined by the relative efforts of the litigants. This approach allows us to clarify the nature 
of the adversarial legal doctrine in our model, even though most adversarial legal systems 
show some inquisitorial elements, such as the (limited) discretion of the judge to discard 
evidence, reject motions or advise during an interrogation. 
The noncooperative prosecution game consists of four stages as displayed in Fig.1: 
The plea offer by the prosecutor (Stage I), the reaction to the plea offer by the defendant 
(Stage II), the prosecutor´s decision to charge (Stage III) and the court (Stage IV). The 
outcomes PU , gU , and iU  represent the utility of the prosecutor, the guilty defendant and 
the innocent defendant, respectively, at the end of the game. 
At the beginning of the game, nature (N) chooses the defendant´s type, which is 
either guilty or innocent. At stage 1, the prosecutor then offers a plea bargain q to the 
defendant, not knowing his true type. The defendant then can either accept the bargain, 
                                                 
6 In the BAKER/MEZZETTI model, the authors propose a constant reputational cost for the prosecutor when 
losing in trial. We believe this to be unrealistic, as the severity of the crime greatly affects the public interest 
in a given case and thus puts pressure on the prosecution department. Also, a model with non-contingent 
reputation costs produces a case separation, and minor cases will never be prosecuted (see BAKER/MEZZETTI, 
2001, p.157). This would completely rule out deterrence for minor crimes. Equilibria in a model with 
contingent reputation costs, however, depend on the effectiveness of the police force, and not on the severity 
of the crime. 
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which ends the game at stage 2, or reject it. If the plea offer is rejected, the game continues. 
The following investigations of the prosecutor then produce an exogenous evidence signal s, 
which may reveal the innocence of the defendant (signal s ) with positive probability. At 
stage 3, the prosecutor observes the rejection of the plea offer and the evidence signal, and 
decides whether to bring the case to court. If the case is dropped, the game ends. If the 
prosecutor charges, both players enter the litigation process (stage 4). Then the prosecutor 
as first-mover can exert effort to convince the judge of the defendant´s guilt. The defendant 
then responds to the accusations and exerts effort as second-mover in the litigation subgame 
to demonstrate his innocence. The relative efforts of the litigants then specify the 
probability of success in court, and determine the respective outcomes PU , gU , and iU . 
 
Figure 1. Sequential Prosecution Game with Endogenous Courts. 
3.2  Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight and foresight differ for decision-makers due to the available information (see 
FISCHHOFF 2003, p.304). In hindsight, outcome knowledge reduces uncertainty and 
distinguishes the ex-post evaluation of decisions from the ex-ante perspective. An economic 
agent will thus revise and update his estimate about the state of the world whenever 
observing new information. Hindsight biased decision-makers, however, fail to remember 
how uninformed they were ex-ante, and their judgment is overly affected by outcome 
knowledge. In other words, the remembrance of their initial estimate will always be closer 
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to the realized state of the world than their true ex-ante beliefs (memory distortion). 
Hindsight biased decision-makers ‘knew-it-all-along’. 
 We follow the approach proposed by CAMERER et al. (1989) and BIAS and WEBER 
(2009) to formally incorporate hindsight bias into our prosecution model. Let s  be a 
dichotomous evidence signal to the prosecutor indicating the defendant either to be guilty, 
s , or innocent, s . For the prosecutor, the ex-ante belief about facing a guilty defendant 
equals the common prior,  . Under hindsight bias, the prosecutor fails to correctly 
remember this initial estimate as his recollection is tilted towards the observed realization 
of the signal s . This can be modelled by defining the distorted remembrance of the common 
prior,  HB , as the weighted average of the true ex-ante probability of guilt and the ex-
post probability of supporting evidence, which is one for s , and zero otherwise. 
      1sHB      (1) 
The distorted remembrance is contingent on the parameter  1;0  which captures the 
magnitude of the hindsight bias. For 0 , the decision-maker is unbiased. 
 The hindsight bias thus distorts the capability of the decision-maker to learn from 
observations correctly. Given new information, economic agents update their ex-ante 
beliefs according to Bayes´ Rule. Hindsight biased decision-makers, however, will have to 
rely on their distorted remembrance of the ex-ante estimate, and are thus subject to biased 
Bayesian learning. In other words, as the remembrance is tilted towards the actual 
observation, hindsight bias leads to overinference from new information. Moreover, the 
hindsight biased decision-maker will usually err when estimating the true ex-ante 
probability from a random sample.7 
 Given the specified prosecution game, only the prosecutor is potentially subject to 
hindsight bias: the prosecutor does not know whether the defendant is actually guilty, and 
he has to learn about the defendant´s type from the observed behavior and from the 
                                                 
7 The biased decision-maker may not err if and only if both overinference distortions cancel each other out. 
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observed evidence of the case. For 0 , the prosecutor is biased in hindsight and 
remembers the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant incorrectly,  0  HB . We 
assume limited rationality to apply in a way that the prosecutor is not aware of being biased 
in foresight, thus, e.g., he would be surprised about his incorrect inference from case 
evidence if the true guilt of the defendants was revealed. 
4. PLEA BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS CONVICTION 
In this game, the prosecutor´s strategy consists of a plea bargain offer q, the decision to go 
to trial when observing a rejection of the plea offer and the evidence signal s, and the effort 
in court. The defendant´s strategy, depending on his type, consists of his reaction to a plea 
offer, and his effort in court. At each information set, a player thus maximizes his expected 
payoffs given the strategy choices and beliefs of the other player.8  
4.1 Stage IV: The Court 
The adversary court system is modelled as a TULLOCK (1975) rent-seeking game. Both 
litigants, the prosecutor and the defendant, may exert costly effort to increase the 
probability of winning the case. We designate the continuous litigant effort for the 
prosecutor and defendant as P and D, and specify 1, DP . Thus, the probability of winning 
the case for the prosecutor can be described by  DPP  , and the probability of success 
for the defendant yields  DPD  . That is, we assume the probability of prevailing in an 
adversarial court for a litigant to be determined only by the litigant´s effort relative to total 
effort.9 For simplicity, marginal effort costs are constant, equal, and set to one. This also 
                                                 
8 Note that due to the circularity between beliefs and equilibrium strategies, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
cannot be perfectly determined via backward induction (see, e.g., FUDENBERG/TIROLE 1999, 326). 
9 This assumption stresses the adversarial nature of the legal system. It also implies that, in the case of equal 
effort of the litigant, the resulting probability of success would be 50 percent. This specification could easily 
be altered to produce a higher probability of winning for the prosecutor, capturing effects of further factual 
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implies, due to 1, DP , that each party de facto faces a fixed litigation cost when entering 
the court.  
The analysis requires a case separation: (i) the standard case where both parties 
actively seek to win in court ( 1, DP ), (ii) the defendant does not actively defend himself 
( 1,1  DP ), (iii) the prosecutor does not pursue his charge in court ( 1,1  DP ), and (iv) 
both litigants remain inactive and the court is fully arbitrary ( 1, DP ). In the following, 
we focus on the most relevant case, case (i).10 
 The defendant, as the second-mover in court, reacts to the effort of the prosecutor 
and chooses his optimal level of effort D  to defend his case. The defendant thus maximizes 
his utility function with respect to D, which yields his reaction function, RD  
PXPD
DP
DXD
D
R 

 


 1maxarg    (2) 
The defendant receives an expected disutility, dependent on the crime X, when losing the 
case with probability 


 DP
D
1 , and incurs effort costs D. Clearly, his optimal reaction 
strictly increases with the severity of the crime, and will eventually decrease for high effort 
levels of the prosecutor. Note that 1RD  always holds in the standard case, case (i). 
 The prosecutor, as the first-mover in court, anticipates the optimal reaction of the 
defendant and chooses his optimal level of effort P  to prevail in court. As the prosecutor 
does not know the defendant´s true type, he has to form (rational) beliefs   about the 
defendant´s guilt. We specify the prosecutor´s belief as   ,,| sqG , which defines the 
believed probability that the defendant is truly guilty ( G ), given the observed rejection of 
the plea offer q  by the defendant, the observed evidence signal s  and the potential 
                                                 
evidence, testimonies or superior prosecutor resources. However, our results in equilibrium would be 
qualitatively unaffected. 
10 An analysis of the remaining cases can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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hindsight bias  . Given the defendant´s behavior RD  and his beliefs  , the prosecutor´s 
utility function )(PUP  is defined by 
  P
DP
P
cX
DP
PXbsqG
DP
P
cX
DP
PXsqGPU
RR
RRP


 





 



1)(),,|(1
1),,|()(


   (3) 
Maximizing with respect to P then yields the optimal effort of the prosecutor, *P , with 
   ²)1(),,|(
4
1
)(maxarg* cbbsqGXPUP PP     (4) 
The prosecutor´s effort in court under uncertainty thus increases with the severity of the 
crime X , his belief about the defendant´s guilt  , and the expected cost to his reputation 
c when losing the trial. His effort under uncertainty decreases the higher the disutility from 
convicting an innocent defendant. 
 The equilibrium strategies  RDP*;  of the litigants in the court subgame then 
produce the probability of success for the prosecutor   P , contingent on his beliefs  , as 
   cbbsqGP  )1(),,|(
2
1     (5) 
The prosecutor´s probability to win the case in court under uncertainty thus increases with 
his beliefs and the expected reputational costs of losing the trial, and decreases with the 
disutility of a wrongful conviction. Clearly, information asymmetry produces a strategic 
disadvantage for the prosecutor and plagues both his effort and his chances in court. The 
stronger the prosecutor believes the defendant to be guilty, the more confidently he can 
pursue his charge and win the case. Due to uncertainty in courtroom, the prosecutor wins 
any given trial with a positive probability which may imply either a correct or a wrongful 
conviction. In contrast to BAKER/MEZZETTI (2001), the specified court itself shows no 
positive verifiability to distinguish between guilty and innocent defendants. Thus, our 
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modelled adversarial court totally relies on the behavior and capability of the prosecutor to 
be welfare-improving. 
4.2 Stage III: The Charge 
The prosecutor observes two signals about the defendant´s type at stage III. First, he learns 
that the plea offer q was rejected. Second, he receives an exogenous evidence signal s during 
the following investigations. Given the two signals, the prosecutor is subject to a potential 
hindsight bias when updating his beliefs and making his decision to charge the defendant. 
 The generated evidence to the case produces a dichotomous signal  sss ;  about 
the defendant´s true type with s  suggesting that the defendant is potentially guilty and s  
indicating an innocent defendant. For simplicity, we follow BAKER/MEZZETTI (2001) and 
assume that the signal s  reveals with certainty that the defendant is actually innocent. In 
other words, the prosecutor interprets this signal as clear proof that the defendant cannot 
have committed the crime, such as a watertight alibi. While a truly guilty defendant can 
never provide a rock-solid proof of his innocence, the investigating prosecutor reveals such 
evidence for the truly innocent defendant with positive probability,  . We specify 
0)|( Gsprob  and 0)|(  isprob . We regard   as the quality of the generated 
evidence signal, which can be affected by prosecutorial resources and power, procedural 
rules, previous investigations by the police and the nature of the crime. 
 Based on his updated beliefs, the prosecutor now decides to charge the defendant 
with probability ),( sq  for a given rejection of the plea offer q and the evidence signal s. 
Clearly, the prosecutor will never charge on the signal s , which indicates the defendant´s 
innocence, as this implies a certain disutility from effort costs and either from convicting 
the innocent or losing the trial. The following condition always holds for 0),( sq : 
 
     
0*),(
),,|(1),,|(),(),(


Psq
cXsqGbXsqGsqsqU PPP


   (6) 
The prosecutor will charge on the signal s , if and only if 
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     
        
0*),(
),,|(1),,|(),(),,|(1
),,|(1),,|(),(),,|(),(



Psq
cXsqGbXsqGsqsqG
cXsqGXsqGsqsqGsqU
PP
PPP



 (7) 
Inserting conditions (4) and (5), and some further simplifications now yield  
b
bcc
sqG 

1
4
),,|(       (8) 
Thus, the prosecutor will only charge the defendant if his beliefs about the defendant´s 
guilt are sufficiently strong. Condition (8) imposes a lower threshold for the prosecutor´s 
beliefs to actually move to court. The higher the disutility from convicting an innocent 
defendant or the higher the expected reputational cost from losing a case, the more 
convinced the prosecutor has to be that the suspect is indeed guilty.  
Integrating the (biased) Bayesian updating of the prosecutor´s beliefs yields further 
insights about the determinants for pressing a charge. The updated belief is given as  
  )1()(1)(
)(
),,|( 
  HBHB
HBsqG .    (9) 
This defines the probability of actually facing a guilty defendant out of all cases where the 
suspect rejected the plea offer and the evidence signal s  was generated, given that the 
prosecutor remembers the ex-ante probability of a guilty suspect as )(HB . The higher the 
quality of the provided evidence signal,  , the more unlikely it is to mistakenly face an 
innocent defendant. Inserting equations (9) and (1) into condition (8) further specifies the 
above discussed threshold for charging the defendant, and yields 
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    MINbccb bbcc   




 41
)1(41
1
1
   (10)11 
 Based on his incentive structure ( cb, ), the quality of the evidence signal  , and his 
limited rationality through hindsight bias  , a distinct ex-ante probability of a guilty 
defendant, MIN , is required for the prosecutor to be confident enough to bring the case to 
court under uncertainty. He will always charge if the prior is sufficiently high, MIN  , 
and never otherwise. We find that 0


MIN , which implies that a better evidence signal 
reduces uncertainty for the prosecutor and thus relaxes the threshold MIN . Interestingly, 
we also find 0


MIN . Thus, the threshold is also lowered and the prosecutor becomes 
more confident to go to court if hindsight bias increases. As hindsight bias induces 
overinference from the observed evidence signal, the prosecutor deems it more likely that 
the defendant is guilty than a rational decision-maker would. This potentially produces an 
inefficiency whenever )0()0(   MINMIN , as the hindsight biased prosecutor 
then charges cases that a rational prosecutor would never pursue. To put it differently, the 
hindsight biased prosecutor is overly confident to confront guilty defendants while he de 
facto excessively charges innocent individuals. 
4.3 Stage II: Acception 
The defendant can accept or reject an offered plea bargain q of the prosecutor. Let )(qG  be 
the probability that the guilty defendant rejects the offer, and )(qI  the probability that the 
innocent defendant rejects it. A defendant who rejects the plea offer receives a disutility 
through the expected sentence and costs through litigation effort only if the prosecutor 
actually decides to put him to trial. Accepting the plea bargain however implies a certain 
                                                 
11 In contrast to the BAKER/MEZZETTI (2001) model, a case distinction for the receiver´s behavior based on the 
common prior is more in line with the standard literature on signaling games (see, e.g., KREPS/WILSON 1982, 
TIROLE/FUDENBERG 1999). 
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punishment q for the defendant. The guilty defendant chooses a strategy )(qG  to maximize 
his utility, specified by 
        qqGDXsqGsqqGU Pg  )(1*,,|),()(     (11) 
In the same manner, the innocent defendant chooses his strategy )(qI  to maximize his 
expected utility, given as 
          qqIDXsqGsqqIU Pi  )(1*,,|),(1)(    (12) 
 As a distinct feature, only the innocent defendant benefits from improved evidence 
to the case,  , and thus is less likely to face a charge upon rejecting the bargain. Given 
these considerations, guilty and innocent defendants may choose different strategies for the 
plea bargain. Consequently, the defendant´s decision to accept or reject the plea offer is 
potentially informative to the prosecutor. 
4.4 Stage I: Plea Offer 
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for the prosecution game consists of the strategies 
 **,*,*,),(*),(* PqDqGqI   and the beliefs ),,|(*  sqG  such that, at any stage of the 
game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from the 
equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes´ rule (FUDENBERG/TIROLE 1999). 
5. EQUILIBRIA 
Distinct from the established law and economics literature on plea bargaining, we consider 
limited rationality and introduce endogenous verification under uncertainty to the 
prosecution game. In this model, the prosecutor may be overly affected by the acquired 
information and ‘knew-it-all-along’. Furthermore, he is strained by the potential threat to 
convict an innocent defendant when presenting his accusations before the court and cannot 
rely on exogenous verification. Both modifications imply a more realistic approach to the 
prosecution process. We show that the major finding of the plea bargaining literature, the 
existence of a semi-separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, still holds, but further 
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conclusions can be made. As before, we focus on the most relevant case where the litigants 
exert positive efforts in court ( 1, DP ).12 
Proposition 1. There is no separating equilibrium (SE) where the defendant always 
reveals his type and the prosecutor makes a positive plea offer 0q , given the 
evidence technology is not meaningless, 0 . 
Proof. The first candidate for a SE is 0)( qI  and 1)( qG . For 0)( qI  to be 
optimal, q  must be       1*1,,|),(1 qDXsqGsqq P   . For 
1)( qG  to be optimal, q  must be     2*1,,|),( qDXsqGsqq P   . As 
12 qq  , no such q  exists. The second candidate for a SE is 1)( qI  and 0)( qG . 
The prosecutor infers   0,,|  sqG , and chooses 0),( sq . Then, 0)( qG  is 
no longer optimal for the guilty defendant. ■ 
This result is in line with the previous argumentation of BAKER/MEZZETTI (2001), 
who demonstrated that any separating equilibrium cannot be subgame perfect. First, the 
guilty defendants expect, on average, a higher sentence than the innocent defendants upon 
rejection of the plea offer, and thus will still accept plea offers that the innocent will 
rationally reject. Consequently, a state where all innocent individuals accept the plea offer, 
and all guilty defendants reject it, cannot be an achieved. Second, if all guilty defendants 
self-select and accept the plea offer, even a prosecutor with limited rationality has no 
interest in suing the remaining innocent defendants.13 Clearly, the threat of litigation is no 
longer credible, and the guilty defendants will then prefer to reject the plea offer as well. 
Subgame perfectness implies that the plea bargaining mechanism can never achieve a 
complete separation between guilty and innocent defendants. 
Proposition 2. i) Given a case with )( MIN , a pooling equilibrium (PE) exists 
with 1)( qI , 1)( qG  and 0),( sq  for 0q . ii) Given a case with )( MIN , 
                                                 
12 An analysis of the remaining cases can be obtained from the author upon request. 
13 Note that the complete separation effectively rules out the problem of overinference from observed signals. 
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a separating equilibrium (SE) exists for 0q  and 0),( sq  with )0(),1( GI  or  
)1(),0( GI , respectively. 
Proof. i.) Due to )( MIN , 0),( sq  is optimal for the prosecutor. The 
defendants optimally react with 1)( qI  and 1)( qG  for all 0q . ii.) For 0q  
and )( MIN , 0),( sq  applies, and the strategies )0(),1( GI  or  )1(),0( GI  are 
(also) optimal for the defendant. ■ 
 This finding shows that plea bargaining cannot serve as a screening device if the 
prosecutor evaluates the case itself as not sufficiently favorable to move to court. Given the 
prosecutor never charges a defendant, both types of defendants have no incentive to accept 
a positive plea offer to evade litigation, which constitutes the pooling equilibrium. Distinct 
from previous literature, we show that overinference affects the equilibrium conditions. As 
the threshold )(MIN  decreases with the degree of hindsight bias  , the range for the 
pooling equilibrium narrows under hindsight bias. To put it differently, the biased 
prosecutor is more confident about his case, which makes a potential charge more credible 
and thus incentivizes some defendants to self-select and accept the plea offer. 
Proposition 3. Given a case with )( MIN , no pooling equilibrium (PE) exists. 
Proof. Due to )( MIN , the prosecutor chooses 1),( sq  and 0),( sq . For 
the prosecutor, very low plea offers cannot be optimal. The innocent defendant 
accepts any plea offer with       1*1,,|),(1 qDXsqGsqq P    and 
the guilty defendant accepts any plea offer with 
    2*1,,|),( qDXsqGsqq P   . As it cannot be optimal for the 
defendants to accept very high plea offers, a potential pooling strategy must reject 
some plea offers with a positive probability. A pooling strategy then implies that all 
defendants accept plea offers with 2qq  . However, 12 qq   holds and this 
contradicts the PE. ■ 
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 This result points out that for cases with a sufficient ex-ante probability of a guilty 
suspect, )( MIN , no pooling equilibrium exists and thus the behavior of the defendants 
is potentially informative to the prosecutor. This stresses the fact that the effective 
groundwork of the police is essential for the plea bargaining mechanism. Furthermore, due 
to 0


MIN , the (wrongfully) increased confidence of the prosecutor, based on 
overinference, forces the defendants to use diverging strategies, and thus turns the game 
more informative. 
Proposition 4. Given a case with )( MIN , then the following strategies and 
beliefs constitute a semiseparating perfect Bayesian equilibrium: 
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Proof. Given a plea offer q that satisfies 12 qqq  , all innocent Defendants will 
reject q, 1)(* qI , and the guilty defendants reject q with positive probability  . 
Firstly, the prosecutor becomes indifferent between charging the defendant or 
dropping the case, when q is rejected  and s  is observed if and only if condition (8) 
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is binding: 
b
bcc
sqG 

1
4
),,|(  . Inserting the Bayes´s update (9), modified 
with the probability   that the guilty defendant actually rejects the plea offer, this 
leads to   b
bcc
HBHB
HB



1
4
)1()(1)(
)(


. Solving for   yields 
        cc bcccc bccHBHB    41)1( 4)1)()1(1(41 4)1)(1(*    , which is 
the mixed strategy for the randomizing guilty defendant. Secondly, the guilty 
defendant randomizes between accepting or rejecting the plea offer q  if 
   *,,|),(2 DXsqGsqqq P   . The mixed strategy for the randomizing 
prosecutor thus is   *,,|(),( DsqGX
q
sq
P 
  . Thirdly, the prosecutor offers 
a plea bargain that maximizes his utility. A natural candidate for the optimal plea 
offer is *q  with   *,,|(* 2 DXsqGqq P   . The plea offer *q  yields a 
higher utility for the prosecutor than any higher plea offer *qq  , if 
    
     
         *,,|(1,,|(11
*,,|(1,,|(
*,,|(1
PcXsqGsqGbX
PcXsqGXsqG
DXsqG
PP
PP
P






Some transformations lead to    *,,|(1* PcXsqGD P    which always 
holds. The plea offer *q  also yields a higher utility for the prosecutor than any lower 
plea offer *qq  , as     qq   1*1  is always fulfilled. ■  
 This finding demonstrates that the previously established semiseparating perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium in a plea bargaining game (see, e.g., BAKER/MEZZETTI 2001) also holds 
under endogenous litigation with asymmetric information and limited rationality of the 
prosecutor. If the prosecutor is confident that bringing the case to court is generally 
favorable, )( MIN , the known self-selection mechanism of plea bargaining is induced: 
some guilty defendants will accept the plea offer while all innocent defendants and the 
remaining guilty defendants reject it, and the prosecutor always moves to court.  
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Guilty defendants generally try to mimic the behavior of the innocent defendants 
and reject the plea offer. However, any increase in rejected plea offers also raises the share 
of guilty defendants which the prosecutor may face in court. Thus, the ability to imitate the 
innocent defendants is limited because increased rejections make the charge more favorable 
to the prosecutor and this further increases prosecutor performance. Our model also reveals 
a positive effect of hindsight bias, as we find 0
* 



. This implies that an increased 
hindsight bias makes the prosecutor more confident in his charge, and turns it more difficult 
for the guilty defendant to mimic the innocent individuals. Thus, quite surprisingly, 
hindsight bias amplifies the self-selection mechanism of plea bargaining. 
6. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Comparative Statics 
In the following, we focus on the interesting case of the semiseparating equilibrium, and 
calculate court errors14 and social welfare for the equilibrium path. We determine the type 
I court error (wrongful conviction) with probability  
  
     *,,*,|*11
11 
 
 sqGe PI .    (13) 
The court produces a type II error (wrongful acquittal) with probability 
      *,,*,|1*11
* 
 
 sqGe PII    (14) 
The efficiency of the prosecutorial system is described by a social welfare function W with 
       
    **)1)(1(*
*,,*,|
*11
*
**1
21 DPXee
XsqGqW
III
P






 (15) 
                                                 
14 Given the equilibrium path, type I and type II errors can only occur inside the court: no innocent defendant 
wrongfully accepts a plea offer, and all guilty defendants who reject the offer are charged by the prosecutor. 
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Social welfare is enhanced by two factors: the first summand shows the positive 
effect of accepted plea offers, defined by the probability of an accepted bargain,  *1  ,  
and the offered sentence, *q . The second summand identifies the benefit from correct 
convictions of guilty suspects, that is the probability that a guilty suspect finds himself in 
court multiplied with the expected sentence, XP  . However, welfare is degraded by two 
factors: the first subtrahend specifies the costs of court errors, given the weighted 
probability of a court error and the seriousness of the crime X. We assume that type I and 
type II error are weighted with 1  and 2  respectively. The second subtrahend illustrated 
the expenditure of legal resources in court, given the prosecutor files a charge. 
Table 1 shows the comparative statics of the semiseparating equilibrium for a given 
crime X . Each column considers a change in an exogenous variable of the game. The rows 
identify the effect of the changed exogenous variable on the endogenous variables, the 
threshold MIN , the optimal mixed strategy of the guilty defendant * , the produced 
probability of court errors Ie  and IIe , and the generated social welfare W . 
  Φ 1) X b c 2) σ ω 
ΦMIN 0 0 + + - - 
γ - 0 + + - - 
eI 0/- 
3) 0 - ? 0 + 
eII 0/+ 
3) 0 + ? 0 - 
W +/? 3) ? ? ? + ? 
ϭͿ Φ ≥ Ϭ.5      ϮͿ c < ϭ      ϯͿ for ;ω=Ϭ/ ω>ϬͿ     
Table 1. Comparative Statics Results. 
The first two exogenous variables show expectable effects. A higher share of guilty 
defendants clearly, c.p., increases the prosecutor´s effort in court to win a given case. Thus, 
less plea offers can be rejected by the guilty defendant in order to make the prosecutor 
indifferent again. This require the defendant to manipulate *  in a way that the (perceived) 
share of guilty defendants in court does not change. Thus, court errors are at least not 
affected whenever the prosecutor is unbiased. In this case, less costly court procedures are 
required and W  increases unambiguously. The total effect on welfare is unclear, however, 
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if the prosecutor is biased. The impact of the seriousness of the crime, X , is similarly 
straightforward: Following condition (15), X  amplifies equally all the positive effects of 
plea bargains and correct decisions, and also the negative impact of court errors and the 
resources spent. In other words, any positive or negative total effect on social welfare is 
enlarged by the seriousness of the crime.15 
The prosecutor´s incentives, b  and c , show more complex implications. As both 
variables, c.p., increase the expected loss of going to court, the prosecutor has to be more 
certain ex-ante that he actually faces a guilty suspect, and the threshold MIN increases. 
Consequently, it is easier for the guilty defendant to mimic the innocent and reject more 
pleas. Then, the prosecutor will eventually face a higher share of guilty defendants inside 
the courtroom. This generates less wrongful convictions and more wrongful acquittals given 
b  increases, as the prosecutor is more afraid to convict the innocent and equilibrium effort 
is unaffected. While the negative impact of less successful plea bargains is considerably 
strong, the total effect on social welfare is also dependent on the assigned weights of court 
errors, 1  and 2 . However, if c  increases, the prosecutor´s stakes are raised in court and 
this boosts his equilibrium effort and probability of winning. Consequently, the net 
outcome effect on welfare stays ambiguous. 
The evidence technology,  , determines the probability that innocent defendants 
are not recognized and ruled out from prosecution when assessing the facts of a criminal 
case. Consequently, an increasing   improves the strength of the evidence signal to the 
prosecutor, and lowers the threshold MIN . Less innocent defendants will be wrongfully 
charged, and thus the guilty defendants have to accept more plea offers in order to keep the 
prosecutor indifferent about his charge. As the share of guilty defendants in court in 
equilibrium does not change, court errors are unaffected. Total welfare increases due to 
more successful plea bargains. 
                                                 
15 Using condition (15) and inserting the equilibrium strategies q*, P* and D*, X could simply be factorized in 
the social welfare function. Thus, X only amplifies a positive or negative sign of the remaining factor. 
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The impact of the evidence technology on outcome has to be carefully distinguished 
from the effects of hindsight bias  . First, a higher bias (mistakenly) increases the 
confidence of the prosecutor in the strength of the signal, as he over-infers from the 
observed facts and behavior. This (mistakenly) lowers the threshold MIN . The higher 
confidence of the prosecutor in his charge, c.p., also boost his effort in court. Thus, a higher 
share of guilty defendants is forced to accept the plea bargains, and turn the confident 
prosecutor indifferent again. The positive effect of hindsight bias clearly is this increased 
self-selection effect. The limited rationality of the prosecutor induces de facto a lower share 
of guilty defendants in court, compared to a fully rational prosecutor, and this produces 
more wrongful convictions and less wrongful acquittals. While the positive effect of a 
higher self-selection is quite strong, the net effect on social welfare is eventually also 
dependent on the chosen weights for court errors, 1  and 2 , and stays ambiguous. 
6.2 Hindsight Bias and the Ex-Ante Probability 
 So far, we revealed an ambiguous impact of hindsight bias on social welfare if 
Proposition 4 holds: while hindsight bias increases self-selection through the plea 
bargaining mechanism, which is clearly desirable, it also amplifies wrongful convictions in 
court. A second, potentially negative effect of hindsight bias emerges if we explore its nexus 
to the ex-ante probability. A hindsight biased prosecutor, who is overly confident that he 
actually faces a guilty suspect, will litigate cases that a rational prosecutor never would. Fig. 
2 illustrates the efficiency effects of this argument. 
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Figure 2. Hindsight Bias and the Decision to Charge. 
For the case of the rational prosecutor, 0 , the graph EUR depicts his expected 
utility of moving to court and charging the defendant.16 The threshold )0( MIN  
identifies the ex-ante probability at which the rational prosecutor would be indifferent 
between a charge or dropping the case, as his expected utility equals zero. For 
)0(   MIN , the potential charge is a credible threat to the defendant, and the semi-
separating equilibrium with some self-selecting guilty defendants is achieved (Proposition 
4). Expected utility EUR and the generated social welfare WR increase in  . Note that WR 
turns negative when   falls towards the threshold )0( MIN , as the rational prosecutor 
does not consider the additional rent-seeking costs for society due to the defendant´s effort 
in court. For )0(   MIN , a charge is not credible to the defendants, and the pooling 
equilibrium unfolds (Proposition 2). 
                                                 
16 The expected utility is calculated before the defendant randomizes. 
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For the case of the hindsight biased prosecutor, 0 , different effects can be 
observed. First, the expected utility of the biased prosecutor becomes inflated due to 
overinference, as depicted by EUHB. As a consequence, the biased prosecutor will move to 
court even when the ex-ante probability is comparatively low, 
)0()0(   MINMIN . Second, the improved confidence of the prosecutor amplifies 
the beneficial self-selection, but also increases wrongful convictions. The social welfare 
under hindsight bias, WHB, shows that the gain in self-selection even overcompensates 
potential error costs for some  . Furthermore, the (wrongfully) overly confident prosecutor 
achieves some efficiency enhancing litigation for even lower ex-ante probabilities (below, 
but close to the threshold )0( MIN ). As   drops, the costs of court errors increase, 
however, and eventually dominate the gains from self-selection. The nexus between the ex-
ante probability of a guilty defendant and the extent of limited rationality thus are crucial 
to understand whether a limited hindsight bias can actually help the prosecutorial system 
to perform under uncertainty or whether it floods the legal system with unsubstantiated 
lawsuits. 
7. DISCUSSION 
Our model clearly contributes to the functioning of plea bargaining as a screening device. 
In contrast to the exogenous verification models (REINGANUM 1988, BAKER and MEZZETTI 
2001), the prosecutor in our game is still plagued by uncertainty inside the courtroom, as 
he still does not know the defendant´s true type. Even though uncertainty clearly degrades 
his performance, we show that the semiseparating equilibrium is still feasible as long as the 
ex-ante probability of guilt exceeds a certain threshold. Distinct from BJERK (2007), we also 
find a sizeable self-selection of the guilty defendants, and the negotiated sentence is not 
reduced whenever self-selection increases. Self-selection increases with the ex-ante 
probability. Interpreting this probability as the quality of the police groundwork, our results 
also emphasize the role of the police force in public enforcement: it is the quality of their 
groundwork that enables the separation in the first place, and that shapes the amount of 
possible self-selection. In a similar manner, one can also conclude that routine cases should 
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lead to more successful plea bargains, as the ex-ante probability is high, while complicated 
cases with ambiguous investigations lead to considerably less self-selection. This fits to the 
observation that prosecutors manage to settle plain cases to free resources for more difficult 
ones (see, e.g., BURKE 2007). 
 The hindsight bias has previously been studied in other asymmetric information 
settings, for example, in investment theory (BIAIS and WEBER 2009). To our knowledge, we 
offer the first formal integration of hindsight bias into the plea bargaining literature. A 
surprisingly positive effect of hindsight bias, which is in line with some previous findings 
by psychologists and behavioral economists (see, e.g., ROESE and VOHS 2012, BECK 2017), is 
the increased confidence of the prosecutor in the strength of his case. As a consequence, 
the bias (wrongfully) mitigates the negative effect of uncertainty on his performance. This 
is particularly interesting for the case of plea bargaining, as this increased confidence of the 
prosecutor puts pressure on the guilty defendants and amplifies the socially favorable self-
selection mechanism. The negative effect is, however, that a hindsight biased prosecutor 
overestimates the guilt of his adversaries, thus wrongfully convicts some innocent 
individuals and also litigates cases that produce de facto a net loss to society.  
Our model allows for some general implications about the hindsight bias in plea 
bargaining. First, the hindsight bias is possibly beneficial for society if the ex-ante 
probability is higher than the threshold for litigation. In other words, the positive effect 
dominates if the overly confident prosecutor can rely on the qualitative groundwork of the 
police force, as this effectively limits the amount of potential type I errors. Second, we 
believe that the nature of the case further determines the net effect on social welfare. For 
cases that are usually ambiguous, that is, show limited evidence or a low ex-ante probability 
of a guilty suspect, the negative effect of excessive charges will clearly dominate the 
favorable self-selection. We thus assume that hindsight bias is particularly worrisome in 
typically difficult cases, such as murder, embezzlement or harassment. Third, our 
theoretical framework allows for some testable hypotheses for future research: (i) hindsight 
bias increases the number of accepted plea bargains, (ii) hindsight bias does, on average, not 
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affect the negotiated sentence, (iii) hindsight bias increases type I errors in adversarial 
courts. 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a plea bargaining model with endogenous courts in which 
(limitedly) rational prosecutors seek to convict the guilty defendants. In contrast to the 
previous literature, we consider the impact of information asymmetry on prosecutor 
performance inside the adversary court, and thus on his bargaining position. Applying a 
sequential litigation game where the charging prosecutor acts as the less informed first-
mover, we show that the probability of successful conviction in court is contingent on the 
prosecutor´s beliefs about the defendant´s guilt, his fear to convict the innocent, and 
reputational concerns.  
 The effectiveness of plea bargaining crucially hinges on the anticipated prosecutor 
performance inside the court. Under uncertainty, the equilibrium strategies are dependent 
on the ex-ante probability that the suspect did actually commit the crime, which, for 
example, can be interpreted as the quality of the investigations by the police force. If the 
investigations are very ambiguous and the ex-ante probability is lower than a specific 
threshold, the prosecutor cannot credibly commit to go to trial and no self-selection is 
achieved. If the case is sufficiently clear, however, a semiseparating equilibrium is still 
obtained where some guilty defendants accept the plea offer and the remaining guilty and 
all innocent defendants go to trial. Self-selection of guilty defendants and, eventually, social 
welfare increase the higher the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant or the more 
conclusive the available evidence. On the contrary, the more the prosecutor fears to convict 
an innocent individual in court, the less self-selection is induced and social welfare 
decreases. Similarly, reputational concerns turn the prosecutor more cautious in his 
decision to charge, and thus narrow the room for successful plea bargains. 
 The existence of hindsight bias can possibly explain why these theoretical caveats 
may be potentially less restrictive in actual criminal procedure. Under hindsight bias, 
decision-makers are overly susceptible to what they observe. As a consequence, economic 
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agents become (falsely) more confident under uncertainty and act bolder, even though 
decision errors increase. In the first formal model of a hindsight biased prosecutor, we find, 
surprisingly, ambiguous effects of this behavioral bias. The positive effect of hindsight bias 
is that the (falsely) increased confidence of the prosecutor puts pressure on the guilty 
defendants and thus amplifies the desirable self-selection. Compared to this welfare 
enhancing effect, the impact of increased court errors remains negligible as long as the ex-
ante probability of a guilty defendant is sufficiently high. The negative effect of hindsight 
bias, however, is that the (falsely) increased confidence also makes the prosecutor press 
charges that a rational prosecutor never would consider. If the ex-ante probability falls 
further below the threshold for a rational charge, the additional social costs of such 
excessive charges then rapidly dominates the social gains from further self-selection, and 
social welfare deteriorates. We thus conclude that (minor) hindsight bias is potentially 
beneficial in plain proceedings, but likely produces additional social costs in rather 
ambiguous criminal cases, such as murder, embezzlement or harassment.  
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